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Introduction
1. Research Questions
This article aims to explore South Korea’s diplomatic strategy towards Japan, 
ROK-Japan relations, and the mutual perceptions South Korea and Japan had 
toward each other during the early Fifth Republic (1981-88) by focusing on the 
initial drafting process of the proposal for the ROK-Japan security-economic 
cooperation (1981-83), implemented during the Chun Doo-hwan regime. 
The essence of South Korea’s diplomacy during the Cold War era lay in 
securing its survival and economic prosperity through close cooperation with 
the US and Japan. The ROK-Japan talks in the 1960s and the ROK-Japan 
security-economic cooperation in the 1980s are thus typical cases in which 
South Korea pursued the strategic coalition of ROK-US-Japan relations as the 
major mechanism for its defense and economic growth. The top leaders, 
government ministries, politicians, and civilians of both South Korea and Japan 
were involved in the process, and the US administrations have provided close 
support for enhanced cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Indeed, 
these procedures and agreements have been pivotal in transforming the ROK-
Japan relations from confrontation to cooperation, as well as in forging the anti-
communist coalition among South Korea, US, and Japan. 
Since the inauguration of the Fifth Republic, the major diplomatic task 
between South Korea and Japan had been the negotiations surrounding South 
Korea’s request for ten billion US dollars of aid from Japan. In April 1981, the 
Chun Doo-hwan administration demanded this amount from Japan—six billion 
dollars in the form of Japan’s Official Development Aid (ODAs), plus four 
billion dollars of private investments and loans—on the grounds that “the 
defense of the Korean Peninsula is of vital interest to the security of Japan, for 
which Japan should also bear some of the expense.” In face of such unpre- 
cedented, to Japan “preposterous,” demands from South Korea, the Japanese 
government remained largely bewildered by the proposal. Also, as the Suzuki 
Zenkō administration at the time maintained Japan’s position that Japanese 
ODAs cannot be granted for any military-related purposes, as well as the view 
that South Korea’s demands were way too excessive for Japan to accept, the 
negotiations between South Korea and Japan on security-economic cooperation 
could not but falter. The succeeding Nakasone Yasuhiro cabinet finally came to 
an agreement to provide an aid of four billion dollars for development and 
stabilization of South Korean economy during the Korea-Japan summit held in 
January 1983. The political deadlock between South Korea and Japan that had 
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set in since the assassination of Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 and the 
military coup d’état by Chun Doo-hwan on December 12, 1979 (hereafter 
December 12 coup), could finally be abated upon the agreement and lasted until 
the end of the Fifth Republic.1 The two years of negotiations between South 
Korea and Japan, from the establishment of the Fifth Republic to the finalization 
of the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation, reflect the varying perceptions 
and interests held by South Korea, US, and Japan in the Cold War context. These 
cases can also serve as an empirical microcosm of South Korea’s diplomacy 
towards Japan and overall ROK-Japan relations during the Fifth Republic. 
Presumably, the stability in South Korea’s diplomatic relations with the US 
and Japan were indispensable for the new military government to legitimize its 
rule as it came to power upon the controversial December 12 Coup and the 
Kwangju Uprising, a mass protest against military rule which took place in 
Kwangju, the provincial capital of South Chŏlla Province, between May 18 and 
27, 1980, after the assassination of Park Chung-hee. Then why did the South 
Korean government turn to coercive demands for massive economic assistance 
from Japan at the start of the Fifth Republic? What or where is the origin of 
South Korea’s “preposterous” rationale in demanding that Japan share the 
security burdens? On what grounds did the South Korea government initially 
come up with the sum of ten billion dollars? Why did the Japanese government, 
despite disagreement, continue to participate in negotiations with South Korea? 
If the US did, in fact, exert its own influence on the ROK-Japan agreement, what 
were the actual demands or rationale of the US? As elaborated, the ROK-Japan 
security-economic cooperation remains largely under veil, in need of further 
clarification and analysis.
2. Literature Review
While both ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation and ROK-Japan talks 
are often studied to analyze South Korea’s diplomacy towards Japan during the 
Cold War era, there is an intriguing dearth of literature that specifically focuses 
on the analysis of the negotiation process of the ROK-Japan security-economic 
cooperation (Okonogi 2002; Yi Chŏng-sik 1989; Son Kisup 2009; Komoda 2013; 
Ogura 2013).
Okonogi argues that the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation provided 
the momentum for strategic cooperation among South Korea, US, and Japan in 
1. While it is a general consensus to depict the ROK-Japan relations as friendly and cooperative 
during the Fifth Republic, some scholars like Victor Cha (2000) have also interpreted the period as 
an era of “instability.”
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East Asia, during which the political leadership of Nakasone proved to be the 
determining factor behind the settlement of the deal. Yi Chŏng-sik elaborates 
on the perceptual gap that existed between South Korea and Japan in explaining 
the slow negotiation process during the Suzuki Cabinet. Son Kisup conducts a 
comparative analysis on the decision-making process of the Suzuki (bureaucratic 
decision-making model) and Nakasone (cabinet-led decision-making model) 
cabinets, and focuses on the role of “informal” diplomatic channels and 
leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone. 
Recently, however, with the release of declassified 1980s diplomatic documents 
of South Korea, several studies have further analyzed the ROK-Japan security-
economic cooperation (Pak Chŏng-jin 2011; Ch’oe Hŭi-sik 2014). Komoda’s 
(2013) research, for instance, criticizes the conventional view that US pressure 
for reconciliation played the determining role in the agreement. Instead, 
Komoda emphasized the leadership of the South Korean government and 
transformation of the perception South Korea and Japan had toward each other 
as the key factors to the settlement of the deal. Ogura Kazuo (2013), then 
director of Northeast Asia Division of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides a 
vivid portrayal of how the security-economic cooperation’s budget size and 
context transformed throughout the negotiation process, referring to his analysis 
on the testimonies of Japanese officials and diplomatic documents. Also, a 
compilation of the negotiation process documented by one of the officials of the 
South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also discovered, providing further 
insights into the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation (Kong Ro-myŏng 
and Im Sŏng-jun 1983). Therefore, an empirical analysis of the overall 
negotiation process has become quite feasible. 
However, one of the main limitations of the existing literature is that the 
studies, without exceptions, have relied on the analysis of declassified diplomatic 
documents in interpreting the negotiation process. The previous studies 
therefore halt at exploring the overall process, without delving into the question 
of where the initial idea for the cooperation originated from in the first place. To 
rephrase, it remains especially unclear from whom and how the idea of security-
economic cooperation between South Korea and Japan emerged and became 
established in South Korean government.
There are three existing explanations on the origin of the ROK-Japan 
security-economic cooperation. First, by extension of the dominant perspectives 
in interpreting East Asia of the postwar era, a significant portion of the 
literature implies the possibility of US involvement in the negotiation process, 
wherein the new military government in South Korea adopted the US’ original 
“burden-sharing” rationale that demanded Japanese contributions to the 
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security of the Asia Pacific region. Focusing on how the Reagan administration 
pressured Japan to expand its role in regional security as part of the US’ 
containment strategy towards the Soviet Union, these studies have interpreted 
the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation as part of the US’ grand strategy 
in the Asia-Pacific region (Yi Chŏng-sik 1989). Nonetheless, halting at mere 
implications, these studies do not specifically mention or delve further into the 
role of the US, nor its involvement in the drafting and negotiation process of the 
deal.
The second major strand of existing literature has stressed the role of the 
South Korean government, claiming that the negotiation began upon the 
initiative and decision of President Chun Doo-hwan (Komoda 2013). According 
to these studies, the new South Korean government’s rationale that Japan had 
been “free-riding” on defense in the region has been an endogenous outcome of 
the new military government’s interpretation of the security imperatives of the 
time. This literature focuses on the leadership of South Korea, especially the key 
personnel of the new military government, which also came with new 
perceptions of Japan that varied from the old generations of politicians and 
bureaucrats who dominated the previous administration. These studies, 
however, do not explain from whom or where the idea of security-economic 
cooperation originated. 
Lastly, several studies have contended that Japan was the origin of the ROK-
Japan security-economic cooperation. Cho Kap-che (1990) argues that Sejima 
Ryūzō, an influential postwar figure in Japanese political and economic circles, 
first proposed and led the ROK-Japan economic cooperation. In specific, Cho 
affirms that Sejima, in meeting with President Chun Doo-hwan in 1980, 
proposed the idea first, along with the discussion of hosting Olympic Games. 
And when Sejima later visited as special envoy of Prime Minister Nakasone, 
Cho argues that Sejima concluded the major framework of the deal in meeting 
with Kwon Ik-hyun, former secretary general of Democratic Republican Party 
and close aide of President Chun. Although Cho Kap-che’s article is less of an 
academic study, the detailed portrayal of the people involved in the negotiation 
process necessitates further empirical scrutinization of the findings. 
3. Main Implications 
The most fundamental question in understanding the ROK-Japan security-
economic cooperation in the overall context of South Korean diplomacy 
towards Japan and ROK-Japan relations of the Fifth Republic is the following: 
Who, and with what purpose, proposed the ROK-Japan security-economic 
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cooperation? Depending on the agent(s) and the intentions of the proposal, the 
meaning and evaluation of the negotiations will vary significantly. Nonetheless, 
given the limitation of available resources for analysis, no previous studies have 
so far focused on the early drafting process of the ROK-Japan security-economic 
cooperation. 
As aforementioned, the existing studies, without concrete evidence, similarly 
assume that the cooperation was proposed by either the administration and/or 
leaders of South Korea, US, and/or Japan. While general consensus is established 
in viewing South Korea and/or the US as the originators of the idea, the ROK-
Japan security-economic cooperation should be newly evaluated if Japan 
(specifically Sejima) was the originator of the negotiation, as Cho Kap-che 
alleged. The question of why an influential figure of Japan would propose such 
idea to the new powers of South Korean regime must be addressed. 
With this background, this article seeks establish how both South Korea and 
Japan played critical roles in the drafting of the initial proposal for the ROK-
Japan security-economic cooperation. With empirical elaboration into how the 
original idea of the negotiation traces back to former Japanese prime minister 
Tanaka Kakuei, and how South Korea’s new military government adopted and 
developed the idea, this article aims to illustrate how South Korea came to 
propose the security-economic cooperation to Japan, which became the bedrock 
of South Korea’s diplomacy towards Japan during the Fifth Republic. Also, while 
the existing literature assumes unilateral involvement of either South Korea, 
Japan, or the US in the making of the proposal for security-economic cooperation, 
this article aims to challenge such views by analyzing the varying perspectives 
and roles of the agents of the three countries. Overall, this is an empirical 
attempt to portray South Korea’s Japanese diplomacy and ROK-Japan relations 
of the early Fifth Republic.
The Origin of South Korea’s Proposal for the ROK-Japan 
Security-Economic Cooperation
1. South Korea’s Diplomatic Relations in the Early Fifth Republic
The Fifth Republic emerged upon the new government’s struggle for legitimacy, 
for which political and economic stability at home and international recognition 
proved indispensable (Kong Ro-myŏng and Im Sŏng-jun 1983, 4). Coming to 
power after the assassination of Park Chung-hee, followed by the controversial 
December 12 coup and Kwangju Uprising, the Chun Doo-hwan regime could 
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not but be highly receptive to the legitimacy question. Also, the new regime was 
confronted with dire economic conditions, plagued with high levels of 
unemployment and inflation, as well as low growth, as a result of the Second Oil 
Crisis. 
The primary diplomatic task pursued by the Chun administration was the 
restoration of partnership with their traditional ally, the US, as well as Japan. 
ROK-US relations during the Park Chung-hee regime faltered throughout the 
1970s as the international system became more multi-polar upon the US-China 
détente. As evident in Jimmy Carter’s administration, ROK-US ties were 
embroiled in series of conflicts including the Park Tongsun incident (Koreagate 
Scandal), the emergence of South Korea’s human rights violations, and the 
potential US troop withdrawal from South Korea. The Chun administration 
sentencing Kim Dae-jung to death after the assassination of Park further 
threatened ROK-US relations. The brittle relations South Korea had with its 
most important ally had profound adverse effects, directly and indirectly, on 
South Korea’s security and international status. In this backdrop, General Chun 
Doo-hwan, elected as the eleventh president of South Korea on August 27, 1980, 
through the so-called “Chang C’hung Gymnasium election,” pursued readjust- 
ment and improvement of ROK-US relations as soon as he came into office on 
September 1 (Kim Yŏng-sik 1994, 425-26). 
The Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, who criticized the Carter 
administration’s human rights and troop withdrawal policies towards South 
Korea, was elected president in 1980. With access to Richard Allan, foreign 
affairs adviser of president-elect Reagan, the South Korean government 
proposed a US visit to South Korea, and negotiations between South Korea and 
the US continued from December 1980 to Reagan’s inaugural ceremony on 
January 18, 1981. South Korea’s consent to the US’ strident request to commute 
Kim Dae-jung’s death sentence led to rapid improvements in relations. President 
Chun was the first foreign guest to be invited to the US on the very next day 
following the inaugural ceremony, and the ROK-US summit was hosted in 
Washington on February 2. With the summit, bilateral relations were finally 
restored, resolving the overall tension that loomed since the Koreagate scandal 
(Oberdorfer and Carlin 2013, ch. 5; Gregg 2014, ch. 17; Lee 2006, 102-29). 
Meanwhile, from the ROK-Japan normalization in 1965 to the 1980s, both 
countries had become the major centerpieces of the US hub-and-spokes system 
in East Asia, serving as the key allies in the US Cold War containment strategy. 
Yet, with the emergence of détente since the 1970s, the security ties between 
South Korea and Japan began to weaken considerably. The abduction of Kim 
Dae-jung under the Yushin regime in South Korea, as well as the Moon 
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Se-kwang incident, deteriorated ROK-Japan relations, leading to frequent anti-
Japanese sentiment in South Korea. Japan’s North Korea policy was also seen as 
opportunistic from South Korea’s perspective. While the 1975 communization 
of Indochina provided momentum for South Korea and Japan to reinforce the 
common bulwark against communism, ROK-Japan relations again began to 
waver since the outbreak of the assassination of Park Chung-hee.
Although the Chun administration sought to restore and elevate ROK-Japan 
relations to a “new level of ROK-Japan partnership,” since the inauguration of 
the Fifth Republic, the restoration of relations took longer than ROK-US 
relations (Yi Chŏng-sik 1989, ch. 5). The ROK-Japan ministerial meeting was 
suspended following the Chun administration’s sentencing of Kim Dae-jung in 
September 1980. 
In addition, ROK-Japan negotiations continued to falter as the Chun 
administration officially requested the Japanese government to participate in the 
security-economic cooperation in April 1981. Also, in the struggle to legitimize 
their rule, the new military regime under Chun Doo-hwan sought the political 
purge of the old collusive ties that had formed between the leadership of South 
Korea and Japan. This was the Chun administration’s strategic departure from 
Park Chung-hee’s approach to ROK-Japan relations. While the 1982 Japanese 
textbook controversy soon settled down, it provided the momentum for a 
nationalist transformation in South Korea’s approach to Japan, translating into 
the Chun administration’s emphasis on the education of history and construction 
of Independence Hall of Korea. The political and economic circles in Japan 
became deeply concerned with South Korea’s growing anti-Japanese sentiments 
and domestic turmoil. The stabilization of ROK-Japan relations only came when 
South Korea and Japan arrived at the final agreement on the security-economic 
cooperation in January 1983.
2.  The Origin of the ROK-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation: Chung 
Ho-yong-Tanaka Talks 
President Chun, inaugurated in September 1980, dispatched military-led 
missions to major countries to secure international support for the new Korean 
government (author’s interview with Kong Ro-myŏng). The president’s closest 
adviser, General Chung Ho-yong, was dispatched to the US. At the time, the US 
Pacific Command hosted annual meetings of special operations commanders 
from the Asia-Pacific region in Hawaii, to which the South Korean Ministry of 
Defense regularly dispatched its special operations commanders. As General 
Chung Ho-yong was expected to participate in the meeting scheduled in 
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December 1980, South Korea’s new military regime sought to use the opportunity 
to get in close contact with the key personnel of the new Reagan administration. 
In advance of Chung Ho-yong’s dispatch to Hawaii, President Chun issued 
two major orders (author’s interview with Chung Ho-yong). First was for Chung 
Ho-yong to confirm the specific dates for the ROK-US summit during his visit 
by meeting with the major personnel of Reagan’s transition team. The Chun 
administration strived to launch the ROK-US summit at an early date. Given 
the strong opposition within the US against the sentencing of Kim Dae-jung to 
death, the ROK-US summit inevitably depended on the issue of revising the 
sentence. The US thereby requested the South Korean government to dispatch 
persons with full authority on the Kim Dae-jung issue, and President Chun 
responded by sending General Chung Ho-yong.2 
The second task for General Chung was to meet with former Japanese prime 
minister Tanaka Kakuei to request Japan’s cooperation on the problem of 
importing Japanese rice. With a bad year of harvest in 1980, South Korean 
government at the time expected to run short of a total of 1.78 million tons of 
rice in the next year (“81 oemi toip,” 1980). The Chun regime, in addition to 0.7 
million tons, sought to acquire an additional one million tons of rice from Japan 
(“Ilbon-mi toip,” 1980). With the ROK-Japan negotiations already underway 
since December 1980, the Chun administration aimed to strike the deal, 
“nemawashi,” by settling with the most influential political figure in Japan, 
former prime minister Tanaka.3
Following President Chun’s directives, General Chung, upon his return from 
the US at the end of December, visited Tokyo to meet with Tanaka. During three 
hours of conversation at Tanaka’s home, Tanaka spoke on various topics, including 
his own experiences in Korea during Japanese occupation, impressions on Korean 
politics and President Chun, as well as international affairs, including the ROK-
Japan relations. As General Chung opened the issue of rice imports by requesting 
“two million tons” of rice from Japan, Tanaka eventually conceded “0.8 million 
2. General Chung in pursuit of President Chun’s orders met with the newly appointed security 
adviser Richard Allan and bargained for the dates and context of President Chun’s visit to the US 
as well as the ROK-US summit, in exchange for reducing Kim Dae-jung’s death sentence 
(Oberdorfer 2013, ch. 5).
3. Although Tanaka resigned at the end of 1974 due to the Lockheed Scandal, he served as the 
sixty-seventh to sixty-ninth prime minister of Japan beginning in 1972. While Tanaka remained 
convicted, he even managed to win the parallel Upper and Lower House elections in October 1980, 
placing over 230 of Tanaka’s factional members in the diet. As the leader of the largest faction in 
the LDP, Tanaka was essentially the “King Maker” in Japanese politics, having promoted Ohira, 
Suzuki, Nakasone and other major Japanese cabinets. (Ōshita 2016, chs. 11-13).
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tons.”4 Tanaka expressed his sympathy for South Korea’s situation and conveyed 
Japan’s responsibility in assisting South Korea:
Tanaka told me that when he was serving as prime minister, he thought that the 
lives of the Korean people sacrificed during the Korean War and the millions of 
people who lost their homes and fled should be compensated. But he had to 
resign before having chance to implement this plan. … Then he said the following, 
as I asked him “to what extent/amount did you think for the compensation?”… 
He said that Japan should pay “at least the costs of stationing two military divisions 
in South Korea.” During my briefing to President Chun, I underlined this part in 
the report, because it was important. I made a red underline of this. (Author’s 
interview with Chung Ho-yong, emphasis added)5
As stated, Tanaka, in his meeting with Chung Ho-yong, introduced the idea 
that Japan should contribute to South Korea’s defense by providing “at least the 
costs of stationing two military divisions in South Korea.” Considering that 
Japan during the colonial period stationed two military divisions, one in Seoul 
(Yongsan) and the other in North Hamgyŏng Province (Nanam), and the US 
also stationed two divisions in South Korea since 1950s, Tanaka’s rationale for 
the contribution lay in this context. General Chung paid attention to this 
particular remark and emphasized the point during his report to President 
Chun.6
Hearing General Chung’s briefing, President Chun decided on the spot “to 
make use of the statement” and began calculation for the sum of reparations. 
While Tanaka’s statement did not specify the size of the budget, President Chun 
himself set the operation cost of one military division at one billion, and 
calculated a total of ten billion dollars for “operating expenses of two military 
divisions for five years” (Author’s interview with Chung Ho-yong). 
As will be elaborated shortly, the economic imperatives of the early Chun 
regime stemmed from dire conditions. Also, as the Chun administration faced 
the pressure of having been inaugurated through non-democratic procedures, 
President Chun found the resolution of economic problems as the regime’s 
4. Although the South Korean government requested a total of “one million tons” of rice during 
the ROK-Japan negotiation held during December 1981, the deal was finalized to a total of “0.7 
million tons.” While the South Korean government had to meet the provisions of the US-Japan 
agriculture treaty to import rice from Japan, the bilateral negotiations between South Korea-US 
and US-Japan resolved the issue.
5. The quoted statements are direct dictation of the interviewee’s comments by the author.
6. While the submitted report by General Chung Ho-yong remains classified, the existence of the 
report has been confirmed by Kong Ro-myŏng (foreign vice minister at the time) who read the 
document.
 Chun Doo-hwan Administration’s Diplomacy towards Japan  231
primary task for securing legitimacy. The Chun administration strived for 
effective measures to secure sizable funds from abroad, which seemed 
indispensable to reinvigorate South Korea’s lagging economy. As President Chun 
received Chung Ho-yong’s report in this context and founded the rationale of 
Japan’s defense “free-riding” from Tanaka’s statements, it seems highly probable 
that President Chun came to draft the government’s new plan to request a sum 
of ten billion dollars from Japan for security in the region. 
The sum of ten billion dollars was a target figure President Chun set himself. 
Questions like “the exact operating costs of one military division” and “why the 
duration is set for five years” were of little significance. The important finding 
here is that President Chun perceived Japan to be “free-riding” on South Korea’s 
defense, for which he requested the money for compensation. In the mind of 
President Chun, ten billion was the amount he could demand from Japan, and 
detailed calculations were of lesser concern to him. 
3.  Discussion on the ROK-Japan Security-Economic Cooperation during 
the ROK-US Summit
As aforementioned, President Chun visited the US at the end of January 1981 
and met with President Reagan at the White House for the ROK-US summit 
held on February 2. During the summit, the US confirmed that there would be 
no force withdrawal from South Korea and approved the sale of F-14s to fulfill 
the US’ defense commitments. They also pledged to resume their bilateral 
dialogues. The US expressed their support for South Korea’s North Korea policy, 
and agreed to oppose any DPRK-US negotiations that excluded South Korea. 
Furthermore, the US conveyed their satisfaction for the resolution of Kim Dae-
jung’s sentencing and declared, although informally, that the US will no longer 
exert any influence on the internal problems of South Korea (“Han-Mi Tandok,” 
1981). 
The greatest achievement of President Chun’s visit to the US was the all-out 
restoration of ROK-US relations (Oemubu 1990, 139). The twelve-year absence 
of presidential visits to the US since President Park Chung-hee’s visit in 1969, 
clearly illustrates the troubled ROK-US relations in the 1970s. With the ROK-
US summit in 1981, both governments agreed to restore their alliances. From 
the perspective of the South Korean government, President Chun’s visit to the 
US and the ROK-US summit proved significant in overcoming the Fifth 
Republic’s shortcomings in security and legitimacy issues.
In relation to ROK-Japan economic cooperation, the following was 
discussed during the ROK-US summit:
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President Chun said that he is grateful for the US’ substantial contribution and 
support for South Korea’s economic development and that he hopes for Japan to 
play more significant role in the security of Northeast Asia, which will be 
indispensable for continuous development in the region. As Japanese prosperity 
was premised on South Korea and the US serving as the buffer zone against the 
Communist bloc, President Chun found that Japan is obliged to provide South 
Korea the budget amount required for stationing two US military divisions in South 
Korea, and that he hoped for the US to persuade Japan on this point. Also, while 
President Chun did not mention specific names, he said that there are a few 
Japanese leaders already aware of the idea. President Chun further pointed out 
that while South Korea spends six percent of GNP, about sixty billion dollars, for 
defense, Japan only spends 0.6 percent [as written on the original document],7 of 
its GNP of 1.16 trillion dollars … President Reagan showed no disagreement 
with the view. (“Han-Mi Chŏngsang,” 1981, emphasis added)
Stressing how South Korea and US provision of security in the region were 
indispensable to Japan’s economic growth, President Chun called for US 
assistance in persuading Japan to provide economic assistance equal to operating 
“two military divisions” in South Korea.8 As for the response from the US, 
President Chun was able to draw “no disagreement” from President Reagan. 
President Chun’s remark that “a few Japanese leaders” were aware of such an 
argument can be interpreted as his efforts to convince the US that such allegations 
were not merely unilateral arguments of the South Korean government, but 
rational and sympathetic to the Japanese leadership as well. In this respect, it is 
easy to understand why President Chun did not specify the name of former 
Prime Minister Tanaka. 
President Chun repeated his remarks during the meeting at the State 
Department held in the afternoon. Secretary of State Alexander Haig replied as 
follows9:
The US is willing to negotiate with Japan on President Chun’s remarks that Japan 
7. The “0.6 percent” seems to be misprint of 0.9 percent. Relevant South Korean and US 
documents use “0.9 percent” (Memorandum of Conversation 1981). 
8. According to US documents, it is written as “President Chun suggested that the Japanese be 
encouraged to extend economic support to the ROK in an amount equivalent to the costs of two 
military divisions. … President Chun urged that the US and ROK work together to get the 
Japanese to do more in terms of spending for defense and to realize that US and ROK forces are 
also protecting Japan.”
9. President Chun and Minister Haig were the representatives of the meeting (“Myŏndam yorok,” 
1981). Meanwhile, then-foreign minister Lho Shin-yong, in a meeting with John Holdridge on 
February 3, agreed to the request for economic cooperation from Japan (Kong Ro-myŏng and Im 
Sŏng-jun 1983, 6).
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should provide the operating expenses of stationing two military divisions in 
South Korea, and thereby bring not only the US but also Japan to contribute in 
the security of the Korean Peninsula …
As illustrated, President Chun formally proposed his initiative for ROK-
Japan economic cooperation during his first summit meeting with President 
Reagan. Not only did the US agree that Japan should duly contribute as a 
member of the Western bloc and second largest economic power in the liberal 
world order, the US government also promised to further support the initiative. 
President Chun did not discuss the ROK-Japan security-economic 
cooperation with other government officials before the ROK-US summit. It 
seems that President Chun himself was not sure about the feasibility of the deal, 
and thereby first tried to observe and inquire into US opinions at the summit. 
Therefore, US support for the initiative, as stated above, provided tremendous 
assurance and confidence to the Chun administration. There was hope that the 
government’s new rationale for ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation 
could also work on the Japanese side as well. 
4. The Drafting of the Initial Proposal for Security-Economic Cooperation
The planning process for the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation is 
especially notable for the vast perceptual gap that existed among the economic 
bureaucrats, diplomats, and President Chun.10 As mentioned above, President 
Chun first invented the logic of security-economic cooperation upon Chung 
Ho-yong’s report on Tanaka’s statements. He then allegedly ordered his aides 
and staff to draft a specific plan for economic assistance worth twenty billion 
dollars (author’s interview with Kong Ro-myŏng). The main rationale here was 
that South Korea would need to call for twenty billion first, in order to bargain 
for the target sum of ten billion dollars from Japan.11 
February 7, 1981 was the first date on which President Chun ordered the 
10. According to Chung Ho-yong, President Chun expressed his concerns that the bureaucrats at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries would not respond positively to the 
idea generated by the president himself. Therefore, President Chun ordered the Ministry of 
Defense to draft a proposal via General Chung Ho-yong, leading to a proposal for six billion US 
dollars, drafted under the leadership of General Choi Youn-sik of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
draft was later circulated among the Economic Planning Board and other relevant ministries for 
reference.
11. According to author’s interview with General Chung Ho-yong, President Chun personally 
coached General Chung to request two million tons of rice—twice the amount of the target sum of 
one million tons—during his meeting with former prime minister Tanaka. 
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relevant ministries to draft the proposal for ROK-Japan security-economic 
cooperation. In his return flight from the ROK-US summit, President Chun 
directed Deputy Prime Minister Shin Byung-hyun and Foreign Minister Lho 
Shin-yong to embark on the negotiation process with Japan (Kong Ro-myŏng  
and Im Sŏng-jun 1983, 6-7). Accordingly, the task force of the Economic 
Planning Board, led by Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs Choi Chang Rak, 
drafted a proposal for the following three weeks detailing the size and contents 
of the ROK-Japan economic cooperation (Lho Shin-yong 2000, 279-81). The 
proposal included receiving four billion dollars from Japan’s ODA program, plus 
one billion dollars in the form of loans from Japanese financial institutions over 
the next five years. Assuming Japan’s ODA would double to 21.4 billion dollars 
during the same timeframe, the idea was to receive about twenty percent of the 
increase, or 800 million dollars per year.12
The proposal drafted by the Economic Planning Board was briefed to 
President Chun at the end of February. Deputy Prime Minister Shin Byung-
hyun, Foreign Minister Lho Shin-yong, and chief economic advisor Kim Jae-ik 
were also present at the briefing. President Chun rejected the draft on the spot 
on the grounds that the five billion dollars proposed was too small, and ordered 
them to redraft the proposal for ten billion dollars (Lho Shin-yong 2000, 280). 
Ten billion was not an easy number for President Chun to forego at the time. As 
result, in collaboration with Foreign Ministry, a new proposal was drafted, 
comprised of receiving six billion dollars—about thirty percent of Japan’s total 
ODA of 21.4 billion dollars—plus four billion in loans from Japan’s Export-
Import Bank. The drafted proposal was adopted by the government on April 17. 
As illustrated, the final proposal was an outcome of the “ideal” draft of 
twenty billion dollars (presidential draft) and the more “realistic” total of five 
billion dollars (Economic Planning Board). The seventy days of planning, in 
essence, focused on a realistic materialization of the president-ordered sum of 
ten billion dollars into specific plans for financing and usage. It was especially 
challenging to find ways to secure the amount of funds within the given budget 
constraints of the Japanese government. Also, it was difficult to come up with 
12. The proposal drafted by the Economic Planning Board assumed a prospective rise in Japan’s 
ODA on the grounds that the Japanese government declared its plan to expand foreign aid. 
Although Japan’s ODA began to lag in the mid-1970s due to the oil crisis at the time, the 
international expectations of Japan’s ODA continued to grow as Japanese economic power and 
current balance projected continuous improvements. Also, while there were growing concerns on 
the prospective values and profitability of the ODA, as Japan’s reparations for the war came to a 
close, the Fukuda cabinet in 1977 announced the plan to double the ODA in five years. http://
www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hakusyo/04_hakusho/ODA2004/html/honpen/
hp102020000.htm (Accessed February 8, 2017). Inada (1985, 300-302).
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ways to spend the amount on social overhead purposes only, without planning 
to spend on arms purchases or other military supplies. Other than the drafting 
process, the negotiation with Japan was also plagued with problems and 
conflicts. On the basis of the ten billion dollar draft proposal, Foreign Minister 
Lho Shin-yong formally requested Japan’s economic cooperation in his meeting 
with Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Sunobe Ryōzō on April 22, marking 
the beginning of the ROK-Japan negotiations that lasted for the next twenty 
months.13 In other words, the entire ROK-Japan negotiation process remained 
under the direct leadership of President Chun, which many bureaucrats at the 
time found difficult to accept and implement. 
The bureaucrats doubted the feasibility of negotiation itself. Although they 
understood the notion of Japan’s “free-riding” in defense, they found it highly 
improbable for Japan to agree to the proposal and commit the huge sum to 
compensate the South Korean government (Yi Chae-ch’un 2011, 148-49). To the 
Japanese, South Korea’s demand seemed largely unfounded in terms of both 
international norms and law. Also, as large-scale assistance from Japan was 
already concluded during the ROK-Japan talks and settlement agreement in the 
1960s, many of the bureaucrats and officials in South Korean ministries thought 
it would be mandatory to abide by Japan’s ODA system, should South Korea ask 
for additional assistance.  
In terms of the proposed size of the budget, ten billion dollars seemed highly 
unrealistic to them as well (Yi Chae-ch’un 2011, 146-47). Considering the fact 
the total sum of Japan’s grants and loans to South Korea over the previous 
sixteen years since ROK-Japan normalization totaled only 1.3 billion dollars, the 
very idea of receiving ten billion over the next five years could not but be seen 
as a delusive goal of the government. Although the bureaucrats did not express 
13. Although the discussions on the overall negotiation process go beyond the scope of this article, 
the main contentions and unfolding of the debates can be surmised as the following: At the outset 
of the negotiation, the Japanese government initially found South Korea’s rationale and size of the 
budget utterly “preposterous” and “astronomical.” Yet, the Reagan administration’s active and 
strategic evaluation of the proposal in the changing Cold War context gradually convinced the 
Japanese government to consider the proposal. Since then, South Korea and Japan contested over 
varying conceptualizations of aid, methods, and size of the budget. For South Korea, the aid was 
justifiable for security grounds, while the Japanese government refused to accept deals that 
associated economic cooperation with security issues. South Korea and Japan also diverged on 
how to deliver the aid. South Korea argued for a lump-sum approach whereby the two countries 
first agree on the total sum of the aid and specify the details of the programs afterwards. Japan, 
however, sought to use their existing approach, which accumulated the sum of expenses annually 
on a project basis. Japan found the ten billion dollars excessive to accept. Through twenty months 
of negotiations, South Korea and Japan finally agreed on a lump sum-based economic cooperation 
of four billion dollars.
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their opinions aloud, they nonetheless remained highly dubious of the directives 
of the military government to draft a proposal for such an astronomical sum. 
As shown, the ROK-Japan negotiation process emerged upon the internal 
divisions among ministries within South Korea. President Chun set the target 
figure, which conflicted with the economic bureaucrats who tried to draft a 
more realistic budget, while the diplomats who tried to adjust the gaps also 
approached the deal with their own conceptions. With the leadership becoming 
the determining factor in the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation, the 
findings above also confirm the existing studies that placed emphasis on the role 
of informal channels of communications—special envoys—in striking the final 
budget for the agreement (Son Kisup 2009).
Critical Review of Counter-arguments /Debatable Issues
1.  Tanaka’s Proposal and Japanese Conservatives’ Perception of the Korean 
Peninsula 
As stated above, this article confirms that the “originator” of the security-
economic cooperation was Prime Minister Tanaka. It would be an exaggeration 
to argue that the idea originated from Sejima, as according to his memoirs, 
Sejima’s role in the negotiation process remained restricted to his involvement as 
a “special envoy,” without elaborating on his role in the initial drafting process of 
the proposal.14
Then why, and on what grounds, did Prime Minister Tanaka provide the 
rationale for security-economic cooperation to South Korea? The answer, as this 
article finds, seems to lie in Tanaka’s Cold War framework of logic. Tanaka’s 
remarks as delivered by General Chung Ho-yong are the following:
We remain under the continuing threat of communism. … The communists’ 
plans to invade South Korea and the Korean War of June 25, 1950 are the outright 
examples. … The division of Korean Peninsula at the end of the Second World 
War was, in essence, communist tactics to spread communism to the South, as 
China also fell to communism. If it was not for South Korea, Japan would have 
14. Although Sejima met with General Chun Doo-hwan twice in 1980 (June and August), there 
were no discussions on the security-economic cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Also, 
President Chun’s own statement during his meeting with Sejima in January 1982, that the idea of 
ROK-Japan economic cooperation was proposed by himself and that he later directed the foreign 
minister to work on the proposal, disproves the previous studies that argued Sejima as the 
originator of the idea (Sejima 1995).
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also become communist. (Author’s interview with Chung Ho-yong)
In other words, Tanaka found that Japan should support South Korea in 
order to prevent communization of the Korean Peninsula. The logic was 
grounded on the communist threat, wherein the stability of South Korea was 
closely linked and indispensable to the security of Japan. 
The originality of Tanaka’s idea can be found in his economic approach to 
South Korea’s security problems. For Tanaka, renowned for his pragmatism, it 
was quite apparent and typical for him to re-envisage Japan’s economic 
assistance as the means for Japan’s contribution to South Korean security. Japan 
should assist South Korea’s economic development in order for them to become 
self-reliant and competitive against the communist forces. Also, in extension of 
Tanaka’s liberalist conceptualization of Japan as a large production base, Tanaka 
is most likely to have assumed that the economic development of South Korea 
would also benefit the national interests of Japan. 
Yet, this article’s tracing of the original idea for ROK-Japan security-
economic cooperation to Tanaka may be challenged, especially when we take 
into account his overall ideological inclinations and experiences. Above all, he 
was very active in improving Japan’s relations with China and first implemented 
the 1972 Sino-Japanese normalization when he came into office (Mikuriya 
2001). It may therefore seem questionable to assume that Tanaka would espouse 
primarily anti-communist rhetoric. Yet, as this article finds, it is important to 
note that Tanaka construed Chinese communism as distinctive from the 
Marxist-laden ideologies of Soviet communism. Put differently, Tanaka’s Sino-
Japanese normalization was not an indication of Tanaka’s pro-communist 
inclinations per se, but his pragmatic approach to securing new markets in 
China that were becoming increasingly accessible due to the US-China détente. 
Also, it is important to note that many conservative politicians of the LDP, 
including Nakasone Yasuhiro, became increasingly aware of the communist 
threat after the fall of Saigon and communization of Indochina in 1975, 
regardless of their earlier agreement for Sino-Japanese normalization in the 
early 1970s. While there may have been subtle differences, the majority of LDP 
politicians shared the anti-communist stance and found South Korean security 
of a vital interest to Japan. 
Another point for contention may be that the Tanaka faction within the LDP 
has been traditionally active in matters involving Sino-Japanese relations, but 
relatively passive on the Korea problem. In this light, it appears aberrant to 
argue that Tanaka initiated the idea of security-economic cooperation first. The 
Kishi/Fukuda factions of the LDP, known for their pro-Korean stance, were 
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most enthusiastic on the issues regarding South Korea, while the Yoshida/Ikeda/
Ōhira factions remained least active. Relatively speaking, the Tanaka faction 
assumed a neutral stance on Korea. Nonetheless, Tanaka’s longtime personal 
experiences in Korea are noteworthy. He ran his own businesses in Taejŏn 
during the colonial period. Also, following the Kim Dae-jung and Moon 
Se-kwang incidents, ROK-Japan relations significantly deteriorated to the extent 
of severing diplomatic ties during his tenure as prime minister. Yet it was 
Tanaka himself who, against strong opposition within Japan, made the political 
decision to amend relations. Given the increasing domestic turmoil in South 
Korea after the assassination of Park Chung-hee, it is rather natural that Tanaka 
was concerned about the situation in South Korea and considered Japanese 
support important in ameliorating the situation.15
Indeed, Tanaka’s political interests embedded in the ROK-Japan initiative 
should also be taken into account, as he hoped to use it as a means to build 
strategic ties with South Korea’s new military government (Ogura 2013, 105). 
One of the main concerns within the Japanese political and economic circles at 
the time was that South Korea’s new military government had anti-Japanese and 
reformist views and would sever the old personnel networks that had 
accumulated between the two countries (Yi Chŏng-sik 1989, ch. 5). As Kishi 
Nobusuke was able to secure various benefits by establishing cooperative 
relations during the Park Chung-hee administration, it is highly probable that 
Tanaka, on similar grounds, also sought to forge close ties with the new military 
government in South Korea via the proposal for economic assistance. 
The last conceivable point for debate revolves around the question of 
whether former prime minister Tanaka could have possibly devised such a 
proposal that would place significant strains on the Japanese government. 
Bounded within the parameters of Japan’s “Peace Constitution,” ODA policy, 
and other institutional constraints, military assistance and lump-sum approaches 
were, in principle, impossible. Tanaka, of course, would have been well aware of 
these circumstances. Nevertheless, the answer to the question may be found in 
the varying rationality of bureaucrats and politicians. To elaborate, the 
bureaucrats are responsible for implementing the tasks determined by the 
politicians under given principles. The politicians, by contrast, as elected 
representatives of the people, shape and determine the larger framework of the 
state, i.e. national strategy (author’s interview with Kong Ro-myŏng). In this 
sense, Japanese government officials insisted on project-based assistance to 
15. Former prime minister Tanaka in his talks with General Chung Ho-yong expressed his 
admiration and sympathy for President Chun, who despite limited education, succeeded to assume 
the leadership of South Korea. 
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South Korea and opposed any security-economic cooperation of a military 
nature or offering special treatment to South Korea. Yet, the rationale behind 
Prime Minister Nakasone’s decision to provide security-economic cooperation 
to South Korea stemmed from his mid- to long-term projection of Japan’s 
national interests as a politician and chief executive of the state (Nakasone 2012, 
ch. 13).
Tanaka’s geopolitical consideration of the Korean Peninsula, embedded in 
his political outlook, can be commonly found in the traditional conceptualization 
of the region by other Japanese conservatives. Indeed, Japan’s strategic interests 
and pursuit of expanded influence in the Korean Peninsula have been a 
historical phenomenon. Japan’s early debate over conquering Korea, known as 
Seikanron (Debate to Invade Korea), exemplifies this strategy by characterizing 
the “Korean Peninsula as a dagger into the heartland of Japan.” It argued that 
Japan should either place the Korean Peninsula under Japanese influence or 
prevent the region from falling into the hands of any other third country. 
Yamagata Aritomo of the Meiji period considered the security of the Korean 
Peninsula as vital for the defense of the so-called “sovereignty line” (shukensen) 
or “interest line” (riekisen) of Japan (Han Sang-il 2000, 65; 2015, chs. 4 and 9). 
On the basis of the Seikanron, Yamagata argued that the Korean Peninsula 
under the influence of another power would be like a “dagger pointed at 
[Japan’s] head.” This provided the rationale for Japan’s aggression against the 
Korean Peninsula and march into the Chinese mainland at the time. To this 
date, the ROK-Japan and DPRK-Japan relations continue to be at the forefront 
of Japanese diplomacy and often become contentious points for debate in 
Japanese politics (Green 2008, 178-80).
To rephrase, the defense policy of postwar Japan has consistently pursued a 
strategic balance in Northeast Asia in order to maintain peace and stability on 
the Korean Peninsula for the security of Japan (Sakata 2013). Tanaka’s proposal 
for the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation was, in this regard, a 
reflection of the fear of communism and a belief in the domino theory, which 
was pervasive in Japanese society at the time. Indochina’s fall to communism in 
the spring of 1975, a year after Tanaka’s resignation, stimulated a paradigm shift 
in Japan’s Korea policy (Yi Chŏng-sik 1989, ch. 4). The US and Japan were 
concerned about another outbreak of the Korean War in the region, and Japan 
thereby perceived the possibility of South Korea’s communization as a significant 
threat to Japan’s economy and security. A communized Korean Peninsula would 
heighten political and ideological bifurcations in Japan, wherein the political 
instability would result in significant economic turmoil and losses at home and 
abroad.
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2. The New Military Government’s Perception of Japan 
In the early Fifth Republic, the Chun Doo-hwan administration prioritized 
economic assistance over amending and stabilizing ROK-Japan relations. As 
elaborated above, the new military government of Chun found security 
assurance and economic stability as essential for consolidating their power. Yet 
South Korea at the time faced a dire economic situation. The high growth rate 
of over ten percent that developed the South Korean economy in the 1960s 
could no longer be maintained, and a negative real growth rate of five percent 
was recorded by the year 1980. Other than low growth, high levels of inflation, 
unemployment, and a current account deficit placed the South Korean economy 
in turmoil, reinforced by the prospective shortage of grain from a poor harvest 
year (Komoda 2013, 49-56). During the presidential address to the National 
Assembly in January 1981, President Chun pledged the government’s “utmost 
efforts for economic recovery and price stabilization.” This was followed by his 
inaugural speech in March, announcing another pledge to free South Korea 
from war, poverty, and political oppression and abuse of power by the 
government. 
When the new military government came to power in 1980, the South 
Korean economy was in a downswing, and the people’s concern was narrowed 
down to the structural problems arising from the asymmetric economic relations 
between South Korea and Japan. The South Korean middle class—mostly in 
their forties—were largely skeptical of any accomplishments from the past 
fifteen years of ROK-Japan relations since normalization in 1965. This post-
colonial generation, students at the time of the normalization, were also major 
opponents against the ROK-Japan talks at the time. South Korea’s dependence 
on the Japanese economy was aggravated, and trade imbalance expanded 
annually. Loud complaints emerged, especially over the point that Japan’s 
economic assistance had only amounted to 1.3 billion dollars, while the trade 
imbalance between South Korea and Japan had reached 20.5 billion dollars 
(accounting for seventy-one percent of South Korea’s foreign deficit) over the 
fifteen years since normalization. The new military government shared this 
sense of economic crisis and the negative perception of Japan that pervaded 
South Korean society.
The aforementioned report by Chung Ho-yong was delivered to President 
Chun amid these controversies. At the time, South Korea spent approximately 
six percent of its GNP on defense (thirty-five percent of the national budget), 
which was comparable to its spending on national welfare. Likewise, President 
Chun considered Japan as obliged to make contributions that duly corresponded 
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to its national power, equaling the “operating expenses of two military divisions” 
at least. His rationale was laid out to Japan when the South Korean government 
formally requested ten billion dollars for economic assistance. Minister Lho 
Shin-yong, in a meeting with Japanese Ambassador to Korea Sunobe in April 
1981, conveyed the rationale of the economic cooperation as follows:
South Korea is experiencing a great deal of difficulty in its heavy spending for 
defense. The stability of the Korean Peninsula is maintained by such burdensome 
defense spending of the South Korean government, which in turn is also 
contributing to the security of Japan. Also, the trade imbalance has increased 
annually since ROK-Japan normalization, reaching an approximate total of 9.5 
billion dollars in the past three years alone. In light of these points, Japan, as a 
major power, is requested to provide a different level of expanded economic 
cooperation to South Korea. (Kong Ro-myŏng and Im Sŏng-jun 1983, 9-10)
Although the Chun administration increasingly pressured Japan for security-
economic cooperation since its inauguration, the significance of ROK-Japan 
relations resided in the diplomatic agenda of the regime. Contrary to 
expectations, the Chun administration set “revitalization of friendly ROK-Japan 
relations and construction of reciprocal partnership” as the new diplomatic goal 
of the government, based on the assumption that Japan would positively 
respond to South Korea’s request for assistance (“Tae-Il chŏngch’aek panghyang,” 
1981). Distancing itself from the Park Chung-hee administration, the new 
military government aspired for new levels of cooperation in ROK-Japan relations 
and establishing a “new partnership upon mutual trust and cooperation.” The 
Chun administration saw Japan as a traditional ally of Korea for cooperation 
rather than for confrontation. South Korea’s diplomatic pressure on Japan at the 
incipient phase of the Chun administration was therefore a strategic tactic of the 
government rather than a reflection of President Chun’s lack of emphasis on the 
significance of the ROK-Japan relations (Kyŏnghyang sinmun, August 3, 1981).16
The Fifth Republic largely maintained the general policy stance of the 
previous Park Chung-hee administration, claiming that the historical problems 
in ROK-Japan relations should be duly managed for economic and security 
cooperation. The 1982 Japanese textbook controversy was thereby shortly 
16. President Chun’s interview with Jiji tsūshin (Jiji News) on May 15, 1981, defined Korea and 
Japan as sharing “common fate,” and expressed his hope that Japan would also come to an 
appropriate recognition of the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula. In a press conference held 
on August 2, President Chun further pointed out that “as Korea and Japan are the closest 
neighbors, ROK-Japan relations are one of the most important diplomatic agendas of the 
government.” He also stated that he is “satisfied with the fact that Japan is recently converging to 
South Korea’s conception of the security of Korean Peninsula.” 
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settled by adding the “Neighboring Countries Clause” (Kinrin shokoku jōkō) (Yi 
Chŏng-sik 1989, 204). Although the Emperor’s remark during President Chun’s 
visit to Japan in 1984 did not meet the original demands of the South Korean 
government, the security-economic cooperation settled in January of the previous 
year remained intact for the stable management of ROK-Japan relations (Pak 
Chin-u 2008, 68-70).
The increasing anti-Japanese movement and criticism of Japan’s colonial 
rule, as well as the government’s confrontational approach to Japan in the early 
phase of the Chun administration, allowed Korea to gain strategic leverage in 
negotiations with Japan. It was also a means for internal political maneuvering 
to address the public’s growing negative perceptions of Japan. The history 
problem was a double-edged sword to the authoritarian South Korean 
government. The hard-line policy against Japan endorsed in the media was, in 
many ways, directed by the new military government to legitimize their rule. 
On the other hand, an unwavering hard-line strategy without accomplishments 
in ROK-Japan relations would also weaken the government’s power. Therefore, 
the new military government had to strategically manage both hawkish 
diplomatic posturing towards Japan and the complicated history problems. 
The Chun administration’s approach to Japan varied from the Park Chung-
hee regime on several points (Yi Chŏng-sik, 1989, 150-51, 251-52; Komoda 2013, 
37-40). The key personnel of the Fifth Republic were of the post-colonial “hangŭl 
(Korean alphabet)” generation and had largely received a Korean education. 
This new generation of leaders aspired to restructure ROK-Japan relations, 
which were rampant with asymmetries, and they especially criticized the old 
generation’s “humiliating” or “defeatist” attitude toward Japan. They also 
condemned the collusive links the old generation forged with the Japanese 
government. In conjunction with the domestic reforms on government 
personnel and society that the Chun regime was administering, they sought to 
transform South Korea’s Japan policy. Rather than merely asking for assistance, 
they squarely requested that Japan compensate South Korea’s spending in 
defense. The ten billion dollar proposal for ROK-Japan relations was based upon 
this new strategic thinking of the military government.
Nonetheless, the political-economic asymmetry and collusive personnel 
linkages forged between the ROK and Japan could not be eradicated throughout 
the Fifth Republic. Although the settlement of the security-economic 
cooperation transformed and stabilized ROK-Japan relations, the new 
authoritarian South Korean government and conservative Japanese regime 
gradually assimilated under their stated pursuit for security and economic 
interests of their countries. Only the agents of ROK-Japan relations had 
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changed. In this lies the foundation for criticisms of President Chun’s Japan 
policy—e.g. that South Korea only became the “weaker power again” in the 
relations and that “Chun Doo-hwan was a mere successor of Park Chung-hee” 
(Yi Tong-jun, 2015).
Regarding the ROK-Japan summit held in January 1983, and September 
1984, evaluations diverge. On the one hand, it was seen as reflection of mutual 
trust and reciprocity newly forged in ROK-Japan relations (Oemubu 1990, 
35-36), while the others have argued that the accomplishments of the summits 
did not exceed the realms of “personal diplomacy” between the leaders. This 
latter group argued that, while the two charismatic leaders, President Chun and 
Prime Minister Nakasone, succeeded in building an ameliorated atmosphere for 
cooperation, the discussions did not deal with the inherent problems that 
pervaded ROK-Japan relations in depth (Yi Chŏng-sik 1989, 230-31). In other 
words, their negotiations made no significant process in dealing with the 
aforementioned textbook controversy, treatment of Korean residents in Japan, 
trade and technology transfer issues, North Korea policy, or other cultural 
exchange matters (Cha 2000, ch. 6). 
In reflection of South Korea’s approach to Japan during the Fifth Republic, 
however, this article finds that the evaluation of the period cannot be confined 
to the implied dichotomous framework as described above—that the relationship 
was either newly constructed upon the strategic thinking of the government or 
that it was merely a continuity of existing structural ROK-Japan relations (only 
embellished with new agents). A more accurate depiction of the reality lies in 
the middle of change and continuity. Despite constraints in the new regime’s 
efforts to reform, ROK-Japan relations underwent considerable changes (e.g. 
generation shift and new strategic thinking); yet at the same time, ROK-Japan 
relations of the Fifth Republic did not bring all-out change, as the Korean 
government remained constrained by the historical problems and structural gap 
in ROK-Japan relations. 
3. The Role of the US
A general, yet implicit, consensus in academia was that South Korea’s demand 
for economic assistance from Japan was “instigated by the US.” The main 
rationale was that, in reference to the Reagan administration’s containment 
strategy in the 1980s, which brought South Korea and Japan into close 
cooperation (Reagan-Nakasone-Chun), the US would have pressured Japan to 
contribute to the security of South Korea (Yi Chŏng-sik 1989, 146). As for 
evidence, many studies have referred to the US-Japan Joint Communique 
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announced in May 1981, which stated that “to secure Japan’s defense and peace 
and stability in the Far East, an appropriate burden-sharing between US and 
Japan is desirable” (“Suzuki Zenkō sōri daijin,” 1981).
The US and Japan’s strategic conceptualization of South Korea (or the 
Korean Peninsula) shared the belief that the security of South Korea was vital to 
the security of Japan (Yun Dukmin 1991). In 1950, the US excluded South Korea 
from the Acheson line, and formal alliance relations had not formed between 
the two countries at the time. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean 
War, the US decided to join the war, as it saw the security of South Korea critical 
for the security interests of Japan and US-Japan relations at large. The US feared 
that South Korea’s fall to communism would become the “dagger” to the 
heartland of Japan, and the surging of North Korea would cause US-Japan 
relations to falter (Rusk 1990, ch. 9). The Korean War had a decisive impact on 
Japan’s early reinstatement and economic revival. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski defined the “pivot states” as countries whose 
importance and role in the international stage derived not from their power but 
their geographical location that exerts determining influence on the power 
balance between major states. And Brzezinski pointed only to South Korea as a 
pivot state in the Far East (Brzezinski 1997, 47-48).17 If rephrased in terms of 
Seikanron, Brzezinski viewed the Korean Peninsula as the “interest line” for 
US-Japan relations. 
Since the Eisenhower administration, the US has consistently demanded 
Japanese economic assistance to expand Japan’s role and contribution to the 
security of East Asia (Yi Chong-wŏn 1996). As observable in the 1969 US-Japan 
Joint Communique (Nixon-Satō), the statement included the so-called “Korean 
clause,” that “the security of South Korea is of vital interest to the security of 
Japan” (Satō Eisaku sōri,” 1969). Such a policy stance of the US administration 
persisted throughout the Carter administration, despite increasing discord in 
ROK-US relations at the time.18
Nevertheless, as this article finds, it is an exaggeration to extend the burden-
sharing discourse between the US and Japan and argue that the US was the 
originator of the idea for the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation. On the 
17. According to Brzezinski, the strategic value of the ROK-US alliance for the US lay in checking 
and balancing Japan’s remilitarization without massive military stationing in Japan. Should the 
Korean Peninsula unify, fall under the influence of China, or change in its international status, 
radical changes in the role of US and Japan in the region may be inevitable. 
18. In November 1980, the US defense minister in meeting with three former officials of Japanese 
Defense Agency stated that the US hoped for Japan’s provision of economic assistances for 
modernization of South Korea’s military forces. 
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contrary, as empirically addressed in this study, the first discussion between 
South Korea and the US on the issue took place during the ROK-US summit 
held in February 1981. It was the South Korean delegation who made the 
suggestion first, as President Chun, in mentioning the “operating expenses for 
two military divisions,” inquired about the US’ opinion on the proposal, to 
which the US responded in “agreement” and promised their “lateral support” for 
the initiative. 
The Japanese diplomatic documents provide additional valid sources for this 
argument. For instance, the Japanese Foreign Ministry in May 1981, a month 
after South Korea’s official request for Japan’s economic assistance, asked the US 
State Department to find out about any US involvement in the proposal.19 The 
State Department responded that, while President Chun requested the US to 
exert influence on Japan to agree on the proposed deal during the ROK-US 
summit, the US made no demand on South Korea to seek economic assistance 
from Japan. Therefore, the conspiracy thesis that the US “pulled the strings” 
from behind the scenes is unfounded.
Then to what extent was the US involved in the ROK-Japan security-economic 
cooperation after the ROK-US summit? Although the US administration 
aspired to achieve the deal, the given sensitivity of the issue made the US refrain 
from direct engagement in the process. The US feared that with the growing 
contentions between South Korea and Japan, the US’ outright involvement in 
the process would only trigger larger voices of opposition from Japan (Ogura 
2013, 41-42).
The US did not maintain full neutrality, however. The US conveyed its 
support for the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation through unofficial 
and/or indirect means of communication. One exemplary case is the press 
interview by Michael Armacost, then assistant secretary of state for East Asia 
and Pacific affairs, during his visit to Japan in September 1981 for the Fifth 
US-Japan Shimoda Conference. Armacost mentioned that the US stationing its 
military forces and providing assistance for market opening contributed to 
stabilizing South Korea after the war, and the US hoped that Japan would also 
provide economic assistance to support South Korea (Sankei shinbun, September 
4, 1981).20
19. The referenced Foreign Ministry document by Ogura (2013, 41-42) is the following: “1981-nen 
5-gatsu 1-nichi zuke gaimudaiji hatsu zai-Beikoku daishi ate denpō dai 20-gō” [On May 1, 1981, 
minister of foreign affairs telegraph to Ambassador of United States, No. 255]; “1981-nen 5-gatsu 
19-nichi zuke zai-Kankoku daishi hatsu gaimudaijin ate tenpō dai 1184gō” [On May 19th, 1981, 
Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 1884, Telegraph].
20. An interview of Acting Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost, entitled “Economic 
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The US did play an indispensable role in the final settlement of the ROK-
Japan security-economic cooperation. It is hardly disputable that the implicit 
understanding of US support for South Korea’s proposal heavily influenced 
Japan to come to an agreement with South Korea. Japan’s concession for a lump-
sum approach, which significantly veered away from Japan’s original principles 
in aid, cannot but be understood as the outcome of Japan’s strategic adjudication 
of US interests. Prime Minister Nakasone, who made the final decision regarding 
the cooperation, mentioned himself that the US emphasis on restoration of 
ROK-Japan relations had been the determining factor to Japan’s agreement. In 
other words, it was Japan’s strategic intention to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, 
more than mere cooperation with South Korea per se, when they agreed to 
provide economic assistance to South Korea in 1983 (Nakasone 2012, ch. 13).
Conclusion
South Korea’s diplomacy in the Fifth Republic can be summarized as a revival of 
the anti-communist coalition among South Korea, US, and Japan, as well as the 
foundation for South Korea’s economic growth. At the same time, the period 
prolonged authoritarian oppression and delayed democratization in South 
Korea (Kim Yŏng-sik 1994, 100). The Chun administration restored the ROK-
US and ROK-Japan relations that were alienated before, and thereby alleviated 
South Korea’s heightened security concerns of the détente period during the 
1970s. The restoration of economic relations with the US and Japan proved 
critical for restarting South Korea’s rapid economic growth. Furthermore, the 
ameliorated relations provided the strategic leeway for South Korea to diversify 
its diplomatic relations with the third world and other non-hostile communist 
countries, which in turn became the foundation for the successive regime to 
pursue Nordpolitik. 
The ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation launched at the beginning 
of the Fifth Republic provided the momentum for both confrontation and 
stabilization in ROK-Japan relations. Although the Chun administration 
pledged to restore relations with both its traditional ally, the US, and Japan upon 
inauguration, the regime gradually consolidated the “US-first and Japan-later” 
phased diplomatic strategy. On the basis of strengthened ROK-US relations, the 
new military government used US’ lateral support as the leverage to pressure 
Assistance to Korea as a Part of Japan’s Security: A Strategic Position” featured in Kyōdō tsūshin 
(Kyōdō News). 
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Japan to engage in security-economic cooperation. As a result, the Chun regime 
was able to break through and consolidate stability in ROK-Japan relations. 
South Korea’s diplomacy towards Japan during the Fifth Republic can 
therefore be interpreted as both continuity and change from the “1965 system of 
ROK-Japan relations.” This distinctive ROK-Japan relationship since 
normalization in 1965 had the two countries placing their shared interests in 
security and economics first, rather than remaining at the contentious impasse 
of historical problems. The backbone of South Korea’s Cold War diplomacy lay 
in reinforcing the ROK-US-Japan anti-communist coalition to secure its own 
security and focus on economic development. The 1960s ROK-Japan talks and 
1980s ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation have provided the decisive 
momentum for strengthening such ties among South Korea, US, and Japan. 
These two cases share similarities in that both were the strategic outcomes of US 
efforts to forge both South Korea (forward base) and Japan (rear base) as the 
centerpieces of the US containment strategy in East Asia. Also, both cases were 
set in the similar context of asymmetrical relations between South Korea and 
Japan. As stark contrasts between the two countries persisted in the form of 
“pluralist democratic society” (Japan) versus “authoritarian state” (Korea), or 
“economic powerhouse” (Japan) versus “developing state” (Korea), the asymmetry 
between South Korea and Japan was also critical in providing the condition for 
Japan to concede a considerable portion of South Korea’s “excessive” demand. 
Nonetheless, as observable from the initial drafting process for the security-
economic cooperation proposal, the Fifth Republic’s diplomacy towards Japan 
could be distinguished from the previous administration. At the forefront, the 
new military government’s perception of Japan brought significant changes in 
South Korea’s overall conception and diplomacy towards Japan. Such a shift was 
an outcome of the various way of thinking between the military and bureaucrats, 
as well as a reflection of the generational gap between the elites of the colonial 
era and the leaders of the post-colonial generation. The new figures of the Chun 
administration aspired to address the structural problems embedded in the 
political-economic relations between South Korea and Japan, and redefine them. 
They duly requested Japan for loans that could contribute to South Korea’s 
defense. While limitations did remain in the Chun administration’s efforts to 
eliminate previous structural ties between South Korea and Japan, the new 
strategic thinking of the Chun administration became a significant foundation 
to the framework of ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation. 
The “free-rider,” “reactive state,” and other general portrayals of Japan during 
the Cold War have labeled it as a passive state, which in response to US pressure 
(gaiatsu) only seeks minimal contributions on the international stage. However, 
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as confirmed in this article, former prime minister Tanaka’s strategic rationale 
for the ROK-Japan security-economic cooperation and his perception of the 
Korean Peninsula suggests that Japan took an active stance, which is not seen 
from its common, reactive portrayal. Put differently, transcendental strategic 
thinking can be found in the Japanese conservatives’ perceptions of the Korean 
Peninsula. This active stance and strategic approach seem to be prevalent in 
Japan’s twenty-first century strategic maneuvering to expand its role on the 
international stage as well. 
• Translated by JO Bee Yun
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